3 The social structure of science
3.1 Learning objective
This chapter introduces a conceptual framework drawn from the theories developed by sociologists Robert K. Merton and Pierre Bourdieu to help you understand how the scientific community operates as a social system. We look at both theories separately, starting with Merton and then Bourdieu.
3.2 Mertonian framework
Merton was a highly influential American sociologist who is said to have essentially created the modern sociology of science. For Merton, the institutional goal of science is the extension of certified knowledge, and the ethos of science comprises that goal and a set of norms that ensure its fulfillment. The following sections provide an overview of part of his work, as well as the work of some of his students and close collaborators, through which they sought to understand the conditions under which science as a social system operates in accordance with the ethos of science but sometimes deviates from it.
3.2.1 The norms of science
Merton (1942) defined four norms of science which are binding to all scientists:
- Communism: Science is a common good. This emphasizes the importance of disseminating discoveries, which is necessary for their inclusion in the common stock of knowledge.
- Universalism: Contributions to the advancement of knowledge need to be judged for their own merit irrespective of the characteristics of the individuals or groups involved. Similarly, access to scientific careers must be based on relevant criteria and not sociodemographic characteristics or other irrelevant factors.
- Disinterestedness refers to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and for the benefit of humankind, and not for personal gains. Scientists are characterized by a passion for knowledge, curiosity, and the desire to ameliorate the human condition. Merton emphasizes that if scientists, as a group, disproportionally exhibit these characteristics, it’s because the scientific system rewards disinterestedness and not so much because naturally disinterested people decide to become scientists.
- Organized skepticism: This norm operates at two levels. First, the institution of science exercises a collective form of skepticism towards beliefs and truth claims and seeks to subject them to thorough examination and empirical validation. Second, every scientific contribution must be subjected to the unbiased scrutiny of peers before being accepted as such and incorporated into the common stock of scientific knowledge.
3.2.2 The reward system of science
Because of the norms of communism and disinterestedness, the motivation of researchers is the recognition they receive from their peers (Zuckerman 1977a). As J. R. Cole and Cole (1973) put it:
Because recognition is so important to scientists, there must be a reward system that identifies and honors scientific excellence wherever it is found. If a scientist desires to acquire “property”, he can only do so through recognition by the system, since there are no other legitimate ways to obtain property in science. (p. 46)
Because the role of researchers is to advance knowledge, the scientific community gradually developed a reward system through which those who best fulfill this role are compensated (Merton 1957). This system works well when those who deserve recognition receive it, and the most promising researchers are provided with the resources they need to realize their potential. According to Merton (1973), this benefits both the individual researchers and science as a whole.
The reward system comprises many reward mechanisms that form a hierarchy. For Merton (1957), the most permanent and prestigious form of institutionalized recognition in science is eponymic reward: the practice of attaching a researcher’s name to a discovery (e.g., Zipf law, Planck’s constant, or Copernican system), a field (Comte, father of sociology), or a period (e.g., the Freudian era, the Darwinian era). Other prestigious forms of reward include honorific awards like the Nobel Prize, membership in academies of science, or other nobility titles. Those who receive such prestigious titles are often seen as the scientific elite and are at the top of the stratified social structure of science (J. R. Cole and Cole 1973).
Because there are limited spots at the top of the hierarchy, there are many researchers whose contributions may be just as extraordinary (if not more) than those of Nobel prize winners but are not awarded such honours (Merton 1968). The scientific community thus creates less prestigious awards and prizes to highlight these accomplishments. However, these are still few in number and only bestowed upon a minority of researchers (Zuckerman 1977b; S. Cole and Cole 1967). So again, there are other mechanisms to reward accomplished scientists, such as nomination to important positions in scientific institutions or as editors of scholarly journals. At the bottom of the hierarchy, visibility is the most basic form of scientific reward: being published and cited by peers (J. R. Cole and Cole 1973).
3.2.4 Accumulation of advantages and disadvantages
The social stratification of science can generate the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages by scientists, thus increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots (Zuckerman 1998). Identifying promising researchers and providing them with a certain advantage has a short and long-term effect on their careers. When it works optimally, the divide between the haves and the have-nots grows exponentially. The best-performing researchers obtain more resources, which they use to perform even better and, in return, obtain even more resources, and so on. According to Zuckerman (1998), the system would become dysfunctional if resource allocation were based on criteria that don’t relate to performance (e.g., gender, religion, ethnicity) or if resources were equally or randomly distributed. Overall, the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages contributes to the social stratification of science, which, according to Zuckerman (1998), is essential for optimizing the scientific system and advancing knowledge.
3.2.4.1 Matthew effect
The value of a scientific contribution and the recognition that the researchers obtain in return is inevitably based on the subjective judgment of their peers, which can introduce some dysfunctions in the reward system. Merton (1968) called this the Matthew Effect, defined as “the accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark” (p. 53). According to J. R. Cole and Cole (1973), the Matthew effect is a direct effect of the social stratification of science, which amplifies the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages by overestimating the merit of some researchers at the detriment of others. The Matthew effect occurs at many levels, such as the recognition of one’s accomplishments, peer-review, awards, research funding, etc.
3.2.4.2 Mathilda effect
Rossiter (1993) showed three decades ago that women in science tended to be disadvantaged by being deprived partly or totally of recognition for their scientific contributions. Like the Matthew effect, this violates the norm of universalism. Women’s most significant scientific discoveries led to their male collaborators winning the Nobel Prize. Even if today the gap between men and women in science has narrowed, women remain less likely than men to obtain awards or important positions (Lincoln et al. 2012; Moss-Racusin et al. 2012) and tend to be less cited (Larivière et al. 2013). It should be acknowledged here that these theories were developed before the generalized recognition of gender as a non-binary concept and that the disadvantages discussed here have been shown to apply to minorities and equity-deserving groups more broadly. I should also mention here that still to this day, bibliometric studies tend to operationalize gender as a binary concept, which is mainly because bibliographic databases do not usually provide the gender of authors, and we must then rely on other available data like first names and geographical location to guess the gender of authors.
3.3 Bourdieusian framework
We now turn our attention to the theories developed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s perspective on science is fundamentally different from Merton’s as it is centred not around a set of institutional goals and norms but around power struggles between pragmatic, self-interested agents.
3.3.1 Field and agents
According to Bourdieu (1975), the social space is divided in several distinct fields that are relatively autonomous and have specific interests and stakes. Science can be understood as a field with the specific goal of advancing knowledge. The field is composed of agents that possess different forms of capital (discussed below) and can be defined as entities recognized by their peers and who internalize the goals and norms of the field. There are two key concepts in this definition. First, the concept of recognition here highlights that certain conditions must be met for an agent to integrate a field, and the concept of internalization, which is tied to the concept of habitus discussed further.
The structure of a field is determined by the relative position occupied by all of the agents in the field based on the type and amount of capital they possess. This structure is dynamic because agents within a field constantly compete and mobilize their capital to acquire more capital, increase their symbolic power, and dominate the field.
There are also meta-fields which have some degree of influence on many other fields. The state is an example of a meta-field since it can, to some degree, impose regulations on other fields and play an important role in distributing resources within fields (e.g., funding corporations and universities). Bourdieu’s theory also includes a field of power composed of agents with a lot of capital that they can use to gain influence in other fields. Think, for example, of movie stars who can mobilize that stardom to gain political influence.
The concept of sub-fields is also important. For instance, the scientific community is formed by a set of agents that share a goal (advancing knowledge), but it is also composed of many sub-fields with their own specific goals (e.g., the production of knowledge in a certain area), practices and norms. The existence of meta-fields and sub-fields highlights the limited autonomy of fields.
3.3.2 Capital
Bourdieu’s theory of capital incorporates Durkheim’s concept of cultural capital and Marx’s concept of economic capital, to which it adds the concepts of social capital and symbolic capital. Every field also has its form of capital (e.g., scientific capital) that can only be acquired within the field and has limited utility outside it.
3.3.2.1 Economic capital
Economic capital comprises an agent’s financial resources, material assets, revenues, and means of production. This capital can be transformed into other types of capital. For instance, in the scientific field, a researcher might invest various forms of economic capital (research funds, work, equipment) to produce a contribution to knowledge and thus obtain some scientific capital.
3.3.2.3 Cultural capital
According to Bourdieu (1979), cultural capital can be embodied, objectified, or institutionalized. Embodied cultural capital is the knowledge of an agent. Objectified cultural capital can be things like books, works of art, or musical instruments. Finally, an example of institutionalized cultural capital is a diploma. While agents may not recognize embodied capital within a field, diplomas and similar credentials can often guarantee a minimal degree of recognition within a field.
3.3.2.4 Symbolic capital
The knowledge and recognition by agents of a field of the different forms of capital that an agent possesses confers symbolic capital to that agent Bourdieu (1987). Thus, symbolic capital is a form of meta-capital that is the supreme objective of agents’ actions in a field, as it is the recognition of one’s position within it. The distribution of symbolic capital ultimately determines the power structure at play in the field.
3.3.2.5 Scientific capital
Scientific capital is a form of symbolic capital specific to the scientific field which determines its structure (Bourdieu 1975). It is the recognition by peers of one’s contribution to scientific progress (Bourdieu 1997). It provides its owner scientific authority and legitimacy in scientific matters. Scientific capital is provided by peers, who are also competitors. This is one of the most important features of science (peer review) and is related to the organized skepticism norm. Furthermore, not all contributions are equal, so the amount of scientific capital an agent may possess is determined by the value and originality of their contribution. The scientific article (or other forms of scholarly publications) materializes that contribution and is an example of what Bourdieu (1971) calls “symbolic goods”: objects that have some value in symbolic capital within a specific field.
3.3.3 Habitus
The habitus of an individual is their mental representation of the world and of their position and the position of others within it. It is the structure of the field in its embodied form (Bourdieu 1989). Agents acquire the habitus of a specific field through learning and experience within it. Through this process, agents eventually recognize the goals, norms, and structure of the field and are thus able to invest their capital strategically. The field and the habitus are thus interdependent. The habitus is structured by the field of which it is the embodied form, but it also structures the field since it guides the action of agents, which alter the structure of the field.
The habitus produces some regularity in the action of agents because it is derived from an objective structure common to all. However, Bourdieu’s theory insists that agents are guided by pragmatism more than by norms or rules. As Bourdieu (1986) points out, “we must avoid seeing in agent’s behaviour more logic than there is, because the logic of pragmatism is to be logical to a point where being logical ceases to be practical” (p. 41, my translation).
3.4 Summary
This chapter explored science as a social system with a set of goals, norms, and a distribution of capital that together define the system’s structure. By looking at the Mertonian and Bourdieusian perspectives, we can understand this system as one where agents are at the same time guided by institutional norms common to all and by their strategies to improve their position in the field. We described some mechanisms through which the system recognizes and rewards researchers for their contributions, this recognition being the main driver of one’s ascension in the stratified structure of science. We also explored factors that can distort these recognition mechanisms, such as the Matthew and Mathilda effects. These remind us that, ultimately, recognition and reward are subjective processes.
Despite their differences, Merton and Bourdieu’s theories have a lot in common, most importantly the principle of social stratification, which provides some researchers with an advantage over others. Furthermore, both theories highlight the importance of accumulating peer recognition (Merton 1957) or symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1987) for researchers. This recognition is mainly achieved by contributing to the advancement of knowledge and playing by the rules of the game, at least as long as one sees this as the best advancement strategy.
3.2.3 Social stratification
The social stratification of science is a systematic effect of the differentiation and evaluation of researchers positioned in a structure that determines their access to resources and opportunities Merton (1968) based on their recognized contributions or potential. Prestigious institutions with more resources recruit individuals with recognized potential, which confers a competitive advantage to these individuals (and to the institutions). And so the stratified social structure of science takes form through a mixture of self and social selection (Merton 1979). Through their contributions to science, the researchers will accumulate power and authority, maintain or grow their advantage, and contribute to the asymmetric distribution of resources, productivity, visibility and prestige (J. R. Cole and Cole 1973).